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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, S u c c e s s o r in 
i n t e r e s t to FIRST NATIONAL 
BANK O F COALVILLE, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent , 
vs . 
BISMARCK INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a corpora t ion , 
R. M. HART, 
Defendant 
Defendant /Appel lant . 
Case No. 14098 
B R I E F O F APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Th i s i s an act ion brought by the F e d e r a l Deposit Insurance 
Corpora t ion to enforce a Guaranty Agreement at tached to the Complaint 
executed by both of the defendants and s ecu red by 1, 629 s h a r e s of stock 
of F i r s t A m e r i c a n Bank and T r u s t Company. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
T h e c a s e was t r i ed to the Court , judgment en tered for plaintiff 
against the defendant R. M. Har t , and said defendant appea l s . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversa l of the judgment and judgment that 
the matter be stayed until bankruptcy proceedings in North Dakota 
have been concluded and the value of the securit ies pledged to secure 
payment of the guaranty determined. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS
 | 
Plaintiff commenced its action by filing a Complaint in the j 
i 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in Summit County, 
! 
alleging that it was the successor to the Firs t National Bank of Coalville.
 { 
The basis of the Complaint is a Guaranty Agreement which was attached i 
i 
to the Complaint and the execution of which was admitted by defendant. 
I 
Payments were made on the amount of the obligation in the sums of i 
$24, 516. 47 at the time of execution, the 11th of January, 1971. f 
i 
Thereafter, on December 1, 1971, an additional payment of $29, 597. 26 
i 
was made which paid $25, 000. 00 on the principal balance, with $4, 597. 26 i 
being applied to interest . As of the time of t r ia l , the balance owing on • 
i 
principal was $175, 000. 00 with interest thereon to April 1, 1975 in the 
amount of $32, 666. 00, which made a total balance payable of $207, 666. 00. 
Judgment for said sum was granted, together with attorney1 s fees in the 
amount of $5, 000. 00 and $22. 00 costs, $216, 666. 00. 
Plaintiff's Complaint was served on the defendants in North 
Dakota on the 26th of December, 1973, but no responsive pleading was 
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filed until May 31, 1974, five months and five days after the acknowledg-
ment of service. The first pleading filed by defendants was a Motion 
to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that the United States Code 
Annotated, Title 28, Section 1345, required the filing of an action by 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the Federal Court or at 
lease made the same a matter of discretion which should be exercised 
in favor of such filing by the State Court. 
This motion was denied and the defendants answered, preserving 
their defense and objection to the jurisdiction of the court, admitted 
the status of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the nature 
of the Bismarck Investment Corporation, but denied all the other 
allegations and put the defendant on its proof concerning the same. 
On or about the 31st of March, 1975, defendant Bismarck 
Investment Corporation, by and through its North Dakota attorneys, 
advised the plaintiff that Bismarck Investment Corporation had filed a 
petition for an arrangement in bankruptcy under Chapter 11. The 
applicable rule in such proceeding is Rule 11-44. It reads as follows: 
f,(a) Stay of Actions and Lien Enforcement. 
A petition filed under Rule 11-6 or 11-7 
shall operate as a stay of the commencement 
or the continuation of any court or other 
proceeding against the debtor, or the 
enforcement of any judgment against him, 
or of any act or the commencement or 
continuation of any court proceeding to 
enforce any lien against his property, or 
of any court proceedings, except a case 
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pending under Chapter X of the Act, for the 
purpose of the rehabilitation of the debtor or 
the liquidation of his estate. n United States 
Code Annotated, Bankruptcy Rules and Official 
Bankruptcy Forms , Rule 11-4, page 329. 
The bankruptcy proceeding and the rules were called to the 
attention of the Court, counsel for defendant moved that the proceeding ! 
be stayed, not only as to Bismarck Investment Corporation, co-defendant, 
i 
but to R. M. Hart, appellant. It was defendants position that the 
guaranty was a joint obligation and the Court could not proceed against l 
one joint obligor when stayed as to the other. (R. 4) 
It was conceded by plaintiff that the proceeding against the . 
1 defendant Bismarck Investment Corporation would stay the proceeding 
1 
as to it, but objected to staying the proceeding as to the other defendant, . 
R. M. Hart. (R. 5-6) , 
i 
The Court determined as a matter of law that the guaranty 
1 
executed by Bismarck Investment and R. M. Hart was both joint and j 
several and refused to stay the proceedings as to R. M. Hart. Judgment i 
i 
was then entered in favor of the plaintiff and against R. M. Hart and 
1 
stayed as to the defendant Bismarck Investment Corporation. (See i 
Findings of Fact, R. 31-33, and Judgment R. 27-28) i 
i 
Defendant did not elect to proceed. Plaintiff put on the evidence 
I 
relating to its claim, witnesses were cross-examined, and the judgment • 







Point 1. The Guaranty Agreement is a joint obligation only 
and should have been so interpreted by the Court. 
Point 2. The Court should have dismissed the Complaint 
and ordered the plaintiff to file its action in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah. 
Point 3. The Court should have ordered the stay of 
proceedings as to both defendants until the arrangement in bankruptcy 
had been concluded with the other defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE GUARANTY AGREEMENT IS A JOINT OBLIGATION ONLY 
AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN SO INTERPRETED BY THE COURT. 
It is appellant's position that the obligation which he undertook 
by reason of the guaranty, Exhibit MAn attached to the Complaint, 
page 3-4 of the Record, is a joint obligation only. 
The crucial language from the first page of the guaranty reads 
as follows: 
ffThe undersigned R. M. Hart and Bismarck 
Investment Corporation do hereby guarantee 
and agree to pay you the sum of $200, 000. 00. fl 
Throughout the guaranty, there is repeated use of the word 
"undersigned" and the undersigned appear to be Bismarck Investment 
Corporation and R. M. Hart. There is no place in the guaranty where 
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there is any mention of several obligations. The Trial Court placed 
an interpretation on the guaranty interpreting it as a joint and several 
obligation and refused to stay proceedings as to R. M. Hart, even 
though Bismarck Investment Corporation, by reason of it's Chapter 11 
bankruptcy application, could not be proceeded against. 
The guaranty contains additional clauses which, it is appellants 
position, clearly show that the parties to the agreement intended it to 
be only a joint obligation. Appellant specifically refers to the paragraph 
i 
of the guaranty, page 3, where the undersigned agree that the guaranty 
will be secured by 1, 629 shares of stock of the First American Bank <j 
i 
and Trust Company. The stock is recited as being in the possession 
I 
of the plaintiff and requires the nundersignedM to execute a pledge | 
agreement pledging the stock. i 
a 
There is no reference made in the Complaint to the First 
1 
American Bank and Trust Company stock and no credit given on the i 
obligation guaranteed for its reasonable value. Nor did the plaintiff i 
i 
request an order of the Court permitting foreclosure and sale of said 
l 
security. * 
Appellant submits that the pledge is clear evidence that parties " 
l 
intended the obligation to be joint. That prior to any action against 
either of the guarantors, a credit would be made for the reasonable 
value of the stock, whatever that may be. After its sale, for the first 
t ime, the personal obligation of guarantors could be determined as 
to amount. 
Plaintiff cited to the Tr ia l Court the provisions of the laws 
of the State of Utah, Section 15-4-1, etc, , for the basic proposition 
that the Court should proceed against the appellant, even though there 
was a stay as to the defendant Bismarck Investment Corporation. 
Utah Code Annotated 15-4-1, etc. , while it defines a number of the 
te rms and defines several obligors, does not define joint obligors, 
and while it provides for credit on joint obligations where payment is 
made by one of the par t ies , there is nothing in the section, as far as 
appellant can determine, that would indicate that the common law is 
not applicable to joint obligations. 
As has been demonstrated by the preceding information, the 
obligation undertaken was by both Bismarck Investment Corporation 
and R. M. Hart and the only language of the guaranty is in the conjunctive, 
and at no place in the guaranty is there any indication that the obligation 
undertaken was to be a several obligation. 
It appears to appellant from examination of the law applicable, 
that under these circumstances there is a uniform rule applicable. 
The rule, appellant submits, i s : 
"Whenever an obligation is undertaken by two 
or more persons, it is the general presumption 
of the law that it is a joint obligation. Words 
of express joinder are not necessary for this 
purpose; but, on the other hand, there should 
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be words of severance in order to create a 
several responsibility. M Willison on Contracts, 
3rd Edition, Volume 2, Section 320, page 650. 
i 
Williston cites many authorities for the rule quoted and 
appellant has examined additional authorities and is unable to find any 
kind of dissent from the basic proposition set forth in the Williston quote. 
A case which quotes extensively the rule cited is Siivertooth 
v. Kelley, 162 Or. 381, 91 P . 2d 1112. The Supreme Court of Oregon 
there set forth what plaintiff submits is a sound rule and should have 
been applied by the Tr ia l Court and requires , it is appellant's position, 
a reversa l of his decision: 
n[8, 9] In determining whether the contract is 
joint or several, the intention of the part ies 
controls: 12 American Jurisprudence 814. The 
ownership of the stock in severalty is an important 
factor, but such fact does not conclusively refute 
the idea of a joint obligation. 
f,[10] In Williston on Contracts, 1st Ed. , §322, 
the rule is thus stated: 'Following the analogy of 
the rule of real property that an estate granted to 
two persons created a joint tenancy rather than a 
tenancy in common, it was clearly held and, 
except as changed by statute, the law remains 
that promises by two or more persons create 
a joint duty unless the contrary is stated. !It is 
a general presumption of law when two or more 
persons undertake an obligation that they undertake 
jointly, words of severance are necessary to 
overcome this pr imary presumption. ' The fact 
that the interests of the obligors in the contract 
a re diverse, does not prevent the duty from 
being joint. But where, as in a subscription 
paper, the obligors state the amount of the 
subscription of each, each is liable for only 
that amount, although there may be no words 
of severance in the promise. This may be 
contrary to early law, but it is supposed to 
be, and doubtless i s , in accord with the 
intention of the par t ies . And there may be 
other cases where the interests are so closely 
several , that a court will disregard the ordinary 
presumption. If by agreement or implication 
of law the contract of two or more obligors 
with their obligee is joint, the obligee is 
entitled to enforce the obligation as a joint 
one, and is not bound by any agreement, of 
which he was ignorant, of the obiigors severally 
with one another, that each shall be liable for 
a ratable share.1 
MIn 6 R. C. L. 878, §266, it is said: In some 
jurisdictions the rule prevails that an obligation 
in solido will never be presumed. But the 
general rule is that an obligation entered into 
by more than one person is presumed to be joint, 
and that a several responsibility will not ar ise 
except by words of severance. In other words, 
an obligation undertaken by two is presumably 
joint, in the absence of express words to render 
it joint and several, or a statute declaring every 
contract, though joint in its t e rms , to be several 
as well as joint. One of the rules for determining 
whether a contract is joint is whether the interest 
of the part ies in the subject matter is joint. 
"In Hill v. Combs, 92 Mo. App. 242, it was said: 
'Under the common law, where two or more 
persons undertake the performance of an obligation, 
the presumption is that the undertaking was joint. 
Words of express joinder are not necessary for 
this purpose. Words of severance are required to 
produce a several responsibility, and in the absence 
of such words the undertaking is joint and not several. ! 
Citing Bliss on Code Plead. §92; 1 Parsons on Contr. 
(6th Ed. ), p. 11; Pomeroy on Rem. and Rem. Rights, 
p . 329. 
n 
[11] Applying the above legal principles to 
the facts in the instant case, we a re convinced 
that the contract is joint since the services 
rendered by plaintiff were for the joint benefit 
of all the stockholders and not for the part icular 
benefit of any one of them. Wolfenbarger v. 
Brit t , 105 Neb. 773, 181 N.W. 932, is particularly 
in point. M 
Wiiiiston also sets forth the rule that where an obligation is 
joint, the Court must proceed, until final judgment, to consider the 
obligation as joint and to grant only joint o rders . The language of 
his rule is set forth in Section 327, Wiiiiston on Contracts, 3rd Edition, 
Volume 2, p . 670, as follows: 
frToday, however, it is generally held, even in 
the absence of statutes, that if the objection is 
not properly made, the defect is waived. But 
as to all who are made part ies defendant the 
duty of joinder continues until final judgment, 
and in order to sustain an appeal or writ of e r ro r 
ail joint obligors who are defendants below must 
be made part ies to the proceedings. In an action 
against several defendants on an alleged joint 
contract a failure to prove a joint liability on 
the part of all has been held at common law to 
preclude a recovery against either party, the 
variance being fatal. 
"Since the obligation assumed by joint contractors 
is single and there is but a single cause of action 
for breach of a joint contract the court can render 
only one judgment in an action for breach of such 
a contract. To give a separate judgment against 
each of the different part ies would be inconsistent 
with the singleness of the obligation. So it is 
held at common law that the court cannot in such 
an action render judgment against one defendant 
and in favor of another, but only one judgment in 
favor of or against all. Those omitted cannot be 
:* 
sued separately for they have incurred no 
several obligation. Nor can they be sued 
jointly with the defendants in the first action 
because judgment has already been rendered 
against the latter and the latter cannot be 
subjected to a second suit on the same obligation. 
flIf a joint judgment cannot be supported as to 
all the defendants, it is erroneous as to all. n 
Williston supplies many citations and texts to support his 
general rule. One of the clear statements is found in Templeton v. 
Morrison, 66 Or. 493, 131 P . 319, at 320, where the following 
language is used: 
uIn an action against joint debtors, where only 
common defenses are maintained, a judgment 
should be rendered against all or none. Fisk v. 
Henarie, 14 Or. 29, 13 Pac. 193; Wilson v. 
Blakeslee, 16 Or. 43, 47, 16 Pac. 872; 
Thomas v. Barnes, 34 Or. 416, 56 Pac. 7 3 . " 
In addition to the cases cited, a direct holding supporting 
appel lants position is found in Morrison v. American Surety Co. of 
New York, 224Pa. 41, 73 Atl. 10: 
"MESTREZAT, J . In Sheppard's Touchstone 
it is said (page 375): !If two, three, or more 
' bind themselves in an obligation thus, obligamus 
nos, and say no more, the obligation is and 
shall be taken to be joint only, and not several. * 
In other words, the presumption of the law is 
that, when two or more enter into a contract 
or an obligation without adding language disclosing 
a different intention, the undertaking is a joint 
and not a several one. This rule has been 
uniformly recognized and adhered to in all our 
c a s e s . n 
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It is respectfully submitted that the Guaranty Agreement is 
a joint obligation only and that a stay of proceedings should have 
been granted as to defendant and appellant as well as to defendant 
Bismarck Investment Corporation. 
POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT AND 
ORDERED THE PLAINTIFF TO FILE ITS ACTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH. 
The record shows that the defendants admitted service and 
that no actual service of summons was accomplished on either of 
them. (R. 005) This admission of service was dated the 26th day of 
December, 1973. From that time until the 30th of May, no pleading 
was made or motion filed by either of defendants. Apparently, during 
that time negotiations were carried on and attempts were made between 
the part ies to settle their differences. 
There is no question but what the United States Code provides 
for original jurisdiction of ail civil actions where the United States is 
a party shall be in the United States District Courts. U. S. Code 
Annotated, Title 28, Section 1345, so provides. 
Title 28, Section 1441, U. S. Code Annotated, grants the 
right to a defendant to remove to the District Court of the United 
States from the State Court any civil action brought in which the District 
-12-
Courts of the United States have original jurisdiction. Such is the 
case now before the Court under the provisions of U. S.C. A. Section 
1345. 
Had the defendants moved promptly, they had an absolute 
right of removal from the Utah State Court to the United States District 
Court. The procedure for such removal is described and provided in 
Title 28, Section 1446, U. S. Code Annotated. Under said section, 
the defendants had 30 days from the receipt through service or other-
wise of a copy of the initial pleadings setting forth the claim for relief. 
Defendants did not file their motion within the 30 days provided by the 
Federal Code. 
On the 31st day of May, 1974, the defendants did file such a 
motion to request that the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
dismiss the case pending there for lack of jurisdiction, and further 
moved the Court for removal upon the ground that the United States 
District Court is better able to apply federal law arising on the matter 
than the District Court of the State of Utah. (See defendants Motion, 
page 6) This motion was argued and the Honorable George E. Ballif 
denied defendants motion. Defendant R. M. Hart submits that this 
was e r ro r . 
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POINT III 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE STAY OF PROCEEDINGS 
AS TO BOTH DEFENDANTS UNTlL THE ARRANGEMENT IN 
BANKRUPTCY HAD BEEN CONCLUDED WITH THE OTHER 
DEFENDANT. 
One of the reasons cited in defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
was the ground that United States District Court was more familiar 
and better able to apply federal law. What has now developed in this 
case demonstrates that this ground was a sound ground and, in the 
exercise of discretion, the Tr ia l Court should have dismissed the 
matter pending and permitted plaintiff to file i ts action in the United 











District Court for the District of North Dakota where both defendants i 
i 
reside. 
The defendant Bismarck Investment Corporation, all part ies 
I 
i 
were informed, filed under the United States Code Bankruptcy Section, 1 
1 
Title 11, Section 701, etc. , governing arrangements , commonly known 
I 
as Rule 11-44 which stays ail proceedings against a debtor filing under i 
Rule 11. » 
i 
The guaranty which plaintiff seeks to enforce is secured by 
• 
1, 629 shares of stock of the Firs t American Bank and Trust Company. « 
(R. 3) Under Chapter 11 the exclusive control over assets of the * 




bankruptcy, and the exact disposition of the security would then 
depend on the kinds of arrangements the Court made for payment of 
the bankrupt's creditors and other people having claims, including 
plaintiff. 
Appellant sought to obtain a stay of proceedings until the 
arrangement outcome had been determined and the other defendant's 
assets aligned to pay whatever obligations it owed, and until such 
arrangement has been completed and the Bankruptcy Court made 
disposition of asse ts , it would be impossible to tell just what amount, 
if any, will remain to be paid by the individual defendant and appellant, 
R. M. Hart. Tr ia l Court refused a stay of proceedings against R. M. 
Hart and it is appellant !s position that this was e r ro r . 
It has always been the law of the State of Utah that there can 
be but one action to collect or recover on a debt secured by real property, 
and the rationale of this ruling, defendant-appellant submits, is 
applicable to the proceedings now before the Court. In Coburn v. 
Bartholomew, 50 Utah 566, 167 P . 1156, this Court recited the 
rationale for a single proceeding on debts secured by mortgage or 
pledge: 
flTo affirm this judgment without requiring 
the plaintiff to first proceed against the fund 
or property set apart for that purpose, 
especially as it stands in plaintiff's name, 
would be to give plaintiff an unfair advantage 
and probably lead to further litigation in order 
to determine the rights of the par t ies . This 
-15 -
question has given us more concern than any 
other question in the case. Comp. Laws 1907, 
section 3498, in part , provides as follows: 
'There can be but one action for the 
recovery of any debt or the enforcement 
of any right secured by mortgage upon 
real estate or personal property, which 
act ion must be in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter, f etc. 
The section then provides for a sale of the mortgaged 
property according to the provisions of law relating 
to sales on execution. Respondent's contention 
that he was not, in this case, compelled to fore-
close his lien upon the water stock is in 
contravention, not only of the express language 
of the statute we have quoted, but the decisions 
of this court heretofore rendered. Bacon v. 
Raybould, 4 Utah 347, 10 Pac. 510; Boucofski v. 
Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 Pac . 117, 2 6 L . R . A. 
(N.S. ) 898. n Pg. U-572. 
While the rule recited in the Coburn v. Bartholomew case, 
supra, applies to real property and the language specifically mentions 
rea l property, it is respectfully submitted that the same basic 
considerations that applied and were recited in the Coburn case exist 
in a situation such as is presently before the Court where personal 
property is pledged to secure a guaranty. 
Appellant respectfully submits that to permit the plaintiff to 
proceed only against him and there being no possibility, because of 
the Chapter 11 proceeding, of a proceeding against the other defendant, 
would be unfair and, as stated in the Coburn case, would probably lead 
to additional litigation after the stock had been liquidated and the 
-16-
arrangement terminated and whatever assets defendant Bismarck 
Investment Corporation had or could apply to this obligation realized 
upon. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully submits that the Court should reverse 
the judgment of the Tr ia l Court, determine that the guaranty is a joint 
obligation only, and that the stay as to Bismarck Investment Corporation, 
defendant, required also a stay as to the defendant R. M. Hart on the 
joint obligation. 
Respectfully submitted. 
DWIGHT L. KING 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for R. M. Hart, 
Defendant/Appellant 
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